EDITORIAL by unknown
YILE LAW JOURNAL
Subs'cription price, $4.50 a year Single copy, SO cents




'WINTHROP G. BRowN GORDON B. TwEEDY
ERWIN H. STEIF Book Rcviewz Editor
Case and Commrnt Editors
C. HAROTD TAYLOR BENJAzIN HEFFNER
Secretary Business Manager
DAviD 111. BURRELL FLORENCE E. GOLDmmN V. HENRY ROTHSCHILD
ALBERT R. CONNELLY GLADYS HARRISON KENNETH RusH
DON E. COOPER PHILIP E. HorMAN JOSEPH A. SEG,LL
HENRY H. FowLEa R. GORDON LOwn, JR.
YALE LAW JOURNAL COMPANY, INC., Yale Station, Nez Haven, Connectimt
Publication Office, P. 0. Box 552, Albany, N. Y.
RECAPTURE REVVE D
THE recent action of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in
response to the application of the railroads for a general increase
in freight rates, struck a new and auspicious note in the develop-
ment of the technique of rate regulation. While rejecting the
application, the Commission made a counter proposal which
would permit specific increases upon designated commodities,
conditioned upon the effectuation of arrangements for pooling
the revenue accruing from such increases so as primarily to
enable the weaker carriers to meet their fixed interest charges.,
"The... proposal ... was a shrewd and adroit stroke of adminis-
trative diplomacy. It disarms at once those who cavil at the
-Commission for never doing anything constructive. It trumps
the carrier's ace, their professed solicitude for railroad credit.
It puts the burden on the rail executives of accepting or rejecting
a plan which aims at a cooperative rescue of the most necessitous
roads. And yet.., there exists only the most tenuous warrant
in law for any such overture.... In the field of diplomacy the
'Fifteen Per Cent Case, 1931, 178 1. C. C. 539 (Oct. 20, 1931).
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proposed pool would be a master stroke; in the field of law, it is
a bit of audacity." 2
The contingency which evoked this proposal is not without
precedent. Although in many respects the economic position of
the railroads in 1920 differed materially from the existing situ-
ation, nevertheless then as now the curtailment of railroad credit
was the most momentous consideration,8 and precisely the same
corrective, the creation of a fund available to weak carriers, was
contemplated through the medium of the recapture provisions
of the Transportation Act.4  The experience of twelve years,
however, has conclusively demonstrated the inability of the ex-
pedient to accomplish the desired result.
Prior to 1920, federal regulation of transportation had taken
the form merely of specific restrictions upon the carriers in an
attempt to eliminate certain flagrant abuses. In that year it
was proposed for the first time to look upon transportation as a
subject of national concern, and by the enactment of the Trans-
portation Act it was sought affirmatively to build up a system
of railways prepared to handle promptly all the interstate traffic
of the country.7 The major difficulty confronting the projected
regulation was the necessity of maintaining uniform rates upon
competitive traffic.s If rates were fixed with reference to the
earning power of strong lines, the weak would be forced into
bankruptcy, and thus a valuable unit of the national transporta-
tion system would be destroyed. On the other hand, rates fixed
solely with a view to the needs of the weaker lines would impose
an unreasonable tax on transportation, and 8eriously curtail the
productivity of the country., It has been strongly urged that
the only ultimate solution of the problem lies in consolidation,10
and in fact provision was made in the Act for the eventual
2 Editorial by Winthrop M. Daniels, former member of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, in the New Haven Journal-Courier, Oct. 24, 1931,
at 8.
3 See Fifteen Per Cent Case, 1931, supra note 1, at 667.
441 STAT. 488, 489 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 15a, par. 6 (1926).
5 See The New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, 189, 43 Sup. Ct.
270, 273 (1923); BEARD, THE AMERICAN LEVIATHAN (2d ed. 1931) 399,
6 SEN. REP. No. 304, 66th Cong. 1st Sess., Ser. No. 7590, at 18.
7 See Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 478, 44
Sup. Ct. 169, 172 (1924).
8 Speech of Representative Esch, (1920) 59 CONG. REC. 3912; Speech
of Representatives Sanders, (1920) 59 CONG. REC. 3452.
9 See Bunn, The Recapture of Earnings Provisions of the Transportation
Act (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 213, 217.
10 Speech of Representative Esch, supra note 8, at 3912; Address by
Ezra Brainerd, Jr., chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, as
reported in U. S. Daily, Oct. 21, 1931, at 1901. But of. Doak, Consolidation




achievement of this end.1" But it was realized that the accom-
plishment of such a project would necessarily require a consid-
erable period of time,'- and as an attempted substitute in the
interim, the device of recapture was adopted. 13 By the recapture
clauses, carriers receiving an annual income in excess of six per
cent of the value of their railway property held for and used in
the service of transportation were to pay one-half of such excess
to the Commission, and the contingent fund so constituted was to
be used by the Commission either by extending credit to carriers
to meet capital account expenditures, or by purchasing equip-
ment and leasing it to the carriers.2
4
Objections to the theory of this devise ranged all the way from
the fear that it would stifle incentive ' to the conviction that it
was a step leading inevitably to government ownership of
railroads.'16 More significant opposition arose from the conten-
tion that it contravened the due-process clause of the Constitu-
tion.117 Its constitutionality, however, was unanimously upheld
by the Supreme Court in Dayton-Goose Creek Ry v. Uqzited
Stoates, 8 on the ground that the recapturable income was never
the property of the carrier, since it held such excess only as
trustee for the United States.
From the standpoint of practicability it was urged, on the
basis of the prior experience of New Hampshire with recapture,
that if necessary the carriers would insure the non-existence of
excess income through extravagant expenditures." Although the
instant opinion of the Commission gives support to this conjec-
ture,20 it seems improbable that modern economic conditions
would permit a carrier to assume the risk necessarily involved
in such a course. Moreover, the assumption of such risk would
"141 STAT. 480 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 5 (1926).
"Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the Commission in 1921 promul-
gated a tentative plan for the consolidation of railroads. 03 I. C. C. 455.
Its final plan was published in 1929, 159 I. C. C. 522, with minor modifica-
tions in 163 I. C. C. 188. At the request of Eastern railroads, portions of
this plan will be reconsidered early in 1932. N. Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1931,
at 5.
'3 See The New England Divisions Case, sitpra note 5, at 191, 43 Sup.
Ct. at 273; SEN. REP. No. 304, 6th Cong. 1st Sess., Ser. No. 7590, at 15.
'441 STAT. 489 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 15a, par. 5 ctscq. (1920).
"S H. R. REP. No. 456, 66th Cong. 1st Sess., Ser. No. 7593, at 9. See
Lovett, Railroad Legislation (1920) 90 CENT. L. J. 75, 31.
16 Speech by Representative Sims, (1920) 59 CONG. REC. 3085.
17 See opinion of Charles Evans Hughes (1920) 59 CONG. RlEC. 3456;
Bunn, op. cit. spra note 9.
Is Supra note 7.
" Speech by Representative Esch, (1919) 5S CONG. REC. 93.17; REP. N.
H. PuB. SERv. Comm., MAcVEAGH, THE TRANsPORTATION AcT or 1920
(1923) 850.
20 Fifteen Per Cent Case, 1931, supra note 1, at 568.
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be needless in view of the obvious vulnerability of the plan on
the question of valuation, for the excess is to be computed on the
basis of "fair value," determined with "due consideration to all
the elements of value recognized by the law of the land for rate-
making purposes." 21 The Commission was authorized to utilize
the results of its investigations under the 1913 Valuation Act,
and in pursuance of this authority it undertook to fix a single
value for each property as of a given date,22 and expected to
maintain a practically, continuous valuation as a matter of
routine.23 Following this formula, the Commission in 1927 made
its first order to recover excess income from a carrier with
less than nine miles of miin line track.24 The carrier's conten-
tion that the valuation was erroneous was upheld by the Supreme
Court in St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United States.25 In many
respects the decision is inconclusive, for although it held that
the cost of reproduction must be considered, it gave no indica-
tion of what would be sufficient consideration. Nevertheless, the
implication of the decision is that the valuation plan of the Com-
mission must be completely revised, and an almost endless
amount of labor expended in the attempt constantly to revalue
the property.26 The O'Fallon decision looked upon the law of
the land with respect to valuation as something distinct from
underlying public policies and their dependence upon a practical
standard of valuation for satisfactory administration.21 A more
satisfactory decision may follow upon the Commission's second
final order, issued in 1931 against the Richmond, Fredericksburg
& Potomac R. R.21 The order will undoubtedly be contested* on
the valuation question, but the recent decline in the price level
may well influence the carriers to withdraw their support from
reproduction cost as the determinative factor in value. But
whatever conclusions be reached on this point, until an explicit
legislative definition of value for recapture purposes is provided,
litigation over value will inevitably continue, with its consequent
devitalization of the recapture provisions.
2141 STAT. 488 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 15a par. 4 (1926).
- The method of valuation adopted by the Commission appears in 75 I. C.
C. 1 (1918). See Note (1930) 8 TEx. L. Rav. 566.
23 See Bauer, The O'Fallon Case (1929) 18 NAT. IVIUN. REV. 458. Tho
primary valuation reports have been substantially completed. REP. INTER-
STATE COmMRCE Coimiai. (1931) 91.
24 Excess Income of St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry., 124 1. C. C. 3 (1927).
25279 U. S. 461, 49 Sup. Ct. 384 (1929).
26 REP. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COIMMc. (1929) 87.
27 See Bauer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 460.
28170 I. C. C. 451 (1931). A tentative order has been issued against
the Norfolk & Western R. R. A protest has been filed by the railroad,
and a hearing thereon assigned for Jan. 6, 1932. Letter from the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, Bureau of Valuation, dated Dec. 7, 1931.
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The concrete results of the operation of the recapture provi-
sions justify the most pessimistic forecasts made for the project.
The Commission has annually issued general orders to the car-
riers to report excess income, 9 on values computed upon such
basis as the carriers may select. In response to such orders a
negligible number of carriers have reported an excess of about
$23,000,000.00,: ° whereas it has been estimated that the amount
due from the carriers for the years 1920-1928 alone is in the
neighborhood of $300,000,000.00.11 The reported income assumes
even less significance in view of the fact that the costly valua-
lions now being produced by the Commission will in all prob-
ability differ considerably from those claimed in the carriers'
reports.32 The total of actual payments made to date is under
$11,000,000.00 - but since practically all payments have been
made with reservations and under formal protest, not even that
fund has been available for the purposes contemplated by the
Act.-
29 3 INTERSTATE CoIMIERCE ACTS ANN. (1930) 2114. The language of
one of these orders is given in MAcVEAGu, op. cit. mpra note 19, at 909.
3 0 REP. INTERSTATE COMmERCE COMM. (1931) 90. Reports have been
made as follows:
Number of Re-
Number of ports in which Total AmountPeriod~05 . of excessReports excess income is
reported income reported
Applicable Period
1920 993 34 2,505,000.03
Calendar year
1921 975 27 458,535.72
1922 931 50 1,867,239.33
1923 903 53 6,909,290.06
1924 899 23 1,196,201.90
1925 894 32 2,402,198.71
1926 882 24 1,090,490.78
1927 873 10 177,566.32
1928 849 19 1,111,613.54
1929 822 27 5,378,101.20
1930 552 9 376,138.72
Total excess .......................................... 23,472,448.91
31 REP. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMM. (1929) 87.
32 Ibid. 84. Cf. Brooklyn East. Dist. Terminal v. United States, 28 F.
(2d) 634 (S. D. N. Y. 1927).
-33The total paid to date is $10,681,249.90. The present status of the
fund, inclusive of payments made, interest on over-due payments, interest
from investments and from bank balances is $13,207,762.78. REP.




Even had recapture been so far successful as to set up a sub-
stantial and applicable fund, however, the conditions stipulated
for its use would make it of doubtful utility under existing con-
ditions. At the present time six per cent money is not particu-
larly attractive, and any carrier which could qualify for the
government loan by providing adequate security and offering
reasonable assurance of repayment 31 could probably do better
elsewhere. But assuming that such fund offered the only chance
of borrowing, an increased debt at six per cent is not in the
nature of direct financial relief to a needy line. 0
Ironically enough, in view of the vicarious character of the
recapture clause, its only positive achievement has been to pre-
vent the consolidation of two railroads on the ground that the
government would be deprived of otherwise recapturable income
of the stronger road.37 But in advocating the repeal of re-
capture, the Commission has presented more important consid-
erations than its failure to accomplish its designated purposes.89
Recapture invites, far more than does rate regulation, litigation
on the part of the carriers, and recovery would often involve
the earnings of several years. Since excess earnings do not exist
in the form of cash, but are reinvested in the business, the car-
riers will resist to the utmost payment of amounts which might
well prove disastrous. Litigation over questions of valuation
arising under Such circumstances would tend to evoke juristic
formulae which might later be used with unfortunate effect on
broader phases of regulation.39
With the recapture device thus the object of attack from all
sides, the recent maneuver of the Commission appears all the
more strildng. In accordance with its proposal, the railroads
submitted a plan for effectuating its terms, but with the signifi.
cant variation, however, that the fund instead of constituting a
community of property in all the carriers, would remain the
property of the contributors and only become available for
loans4 ° The ultimate effect of a credit extension must be to
increase the burden on the weaker carriers, while the stronger
roads will benefit indirectly from revenue denied to them as a
direct increase. The exigencies of the situation, however, were
undoubtedly felt by the Commission to outveigh these consider-
-541 STAT. 490 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 15a, par. 12 (1926).
96 Speech by Representative Sims, supra note 16, at 3684.
-3 Lease of Tionesta Valley Ry., 94 I. C. C. 39 (1924), acI'd 105 I. C. C.
570 (1926). The only substantial activity of the carriers under the recap-
ture clauses has been in attempts to qualify under the new line exception.
3 INTERSTATE CoIMERCE AcTs ANN. (1930) 2124.
38 Special report to SEN. Comm. oN INTERSTATE Com1nERcI, May 17, 1930.
89 REP. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COmm. (1930) 90.
4oU. S. Daily, Nov. 20, 1931, at 2139.
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ations, and the plan was approved in order to avoid pro-
longed negotiations. 1 As a credit plan, it is not open to the in-
terest rate and security objections to the supposititious recapture
fund, for the qualifications are flexible and are based on con-
temporary conditions. Moreover, according to estimates, the
function of the recapture clauses to provide capital will be ful-
filled far beyond the expectations of the earlier provisions4 2
Since no question of valuation is involved, the administrative
difficulties which beset the path of recapture are practically
eliminated, and for the same reason the possibility of litigation
is reduced to a minimum.
The plan is admittedly an emergency measure, 3 and does not
purport to provide a panacea for the ills of transportation, but
only a temporary expedient to meet the problem of the weak and
strong railroads pending the advent of consolidation." Like re-
capture, this ad interim proposal will undoubtedly be subjected
to adverse criticism. Express authority for a conditional rate
increase would be difficult to find, although the attitude of the
Supreme Court in the Dayton-Goose Creek case might suggest
that the spirit of the Transportation Act is sufficiently ample to
embrace even this procedure. But the most significant aspect of
the plan is the fact that it represents a constructive and ingen-
ious move initiated by the Commission, at a time when ingen-
ious moves are deemed peculiarly within the province of the rail-
roads.
41 U. S. Daily, Dec. 8, 1931, at 2275.
Commissioners Eastman, McSlanamy, Mlahaffie and Porter dissented.
Excerpts from Commissioner Eastman's dissent appear in the U. S. Daily,
Dec. 12, 1931, at 2314, Dec. 12, at 2322, Dec. 14, at 2332, and Dec. 15, at
2342. Commissioner Eastman regarded with "foreboding and apprahen-
sion" the introduction into the situation of the unregulated private Dela-
ware Corporation which was suggested by the carriers as the medium for
the loans.
42The Commission hoped to realize over $100,000,000 a year from the
pool. A more recent study by Standard Statistics, Inc., places the annual
increase at about $67,500,000, based on expected traffic. Both estimates
must be revised somewhat in view of the change from car to tonnage
basis. IS STANDRDW SERVICE ON RAILROADS (1931) 2418.
43 It is expressly limited in duration to March 31, 1933- Fifteen Per
Cent Case, 1931, supra note 1, at 578.
"Another illustration of the Commission's efforts to alleviate the diffi-
culties of weak carriers by temporary expedients is its attempted revision
of care-hire arrangements. 165 I. C. C. 495 (1930) (partial relief of 0hort
lines from daily rentals). The plan was frustrated by the Supreme Court.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. v. United States, reported in U. S.
Daily, Nov. 24, 1931, at 2170.
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RIGHTS OF GENERAL DEPOSITORS IN ASSETS OF
INSOLVENT BANKS
STATISTICS appearing in the annual reports of the Comptroller
of the Currency indicate a material appreciation in recent years
in the number and amount of preferred claims allowed against
the assets of liquidating banks.1 In part this development may
be due to a tendency on the part of some courts to relax the par-
ticularity with which the funds on which the claim for prefer-
ence is based must be traced and identified.2 For example, in
most jurisdictions, it is now held that the deposit of a check in
the bank on which it is drawn constitutes an "augmentation of
assets",3 despite the obvious fact that it represents merely a di-
minution of the liabilities of the bank to the depositor. Again,
it has been ruled that if the proceeds of a collection item have
been traced into the cash assets of a bank, a priority may attach
to the entire assets including credits with correspondents, checks,
and overdrafts.4 A few courts have entirely dispensed with the
1 During the fiscal year ending Oct. 31, 1930, out of $28,224,066, general
creditors with claims aggregating $19,993,710 received only $10,576,000,
while secured and preferred creditors claiming $14,387,629 were paid $13,-
451,712. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (1930)
31. From the date of the first national bank failure in 1865 until Oct.
31, 1925, out of distributable assets totalling $314,407,614, $84,967,057
worth of preferred liabilities were paid, while general creditors received
$188,697,889. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRINOY
(1925) 6, 7.
2 Ordinarily the claimant of a preference must show not only that his
funds were held on a constructive trust but also that they augmented the
commingled assets in the hands of the receiver. See Tinsley v. Amos, 135
So. 397, 399 (Fla. 1931); Townsend, Constructive Trusts and Bank Collec-
tions (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 980. Cf. Salem Elevator Works v. Commis-
sioner of Banks, 252 Mass. 366, 148 N. E. 20 (1925) (requiring that the
res be traced into a specific property as distinguished from augmented
general assets). In proving augmentation, the claimant is aided by the
presumption that withdrawals by the trustee from the commingled funds
have left the trust property intact (Note (1931) 16 IOWA L. Rmv. 256,
259) to the extent that the cash assets of the bank were not exhausted
or depleted below the value of the trust r'es subsequent to Its deposit.
Blumenfeld v. Union National Bank of Beloit, 38 F. (2d) 455 (C. C. A.
10th, 1930); 3 POMEROY, EQuiTY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed, 1918) § 1048
(e). But cf. Central National Bank of Lincoln v. First National Bank
of Gering, 115 Neb. 472, 216 N. W. 302 (1927).
3 United States National Bank of Omaha v. Glanton, 146 Ga. 786, 92
S. E. 625 (1917); Skinner v. Porter, 45 Idaho 530, 263 Pac. 993 (1928);
Leach v. Farmers' Savings Bank of Hamburg, 204 Iowa 1083, 216 N. W.
748 (1927); State v. Excello Feed Milling Co., 131 Okla. 100, 267 Pac
833 (1928). Contra: Rorebeck v. Benedict Flour & Feed Co., 26 F. (2d)
440 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Hecker-Jones-Jewell Milling Co. v. Cosmopolitan
Trust Co., 242 Mass. 181, 136 N. E. 333 (1922).
4 State v. Bank of Commerce of Grand Island, 61 Neb. 181, 85 N. W.
[Vol. 41432
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necessity for tracing the trust res into the hands of the receiver.5
However, in view of the fact that most of the traditional re-
quirements of a preference are still observed in a majority of
jurisdictionse it seems probable that the augmentation of the
class of preferred creditors is for the most part due rather to
recent legislation than to tendencies of the cou'ts. The past few
years have witnessed the passage of many statutes looking to
the protection of the owner or forwarder of collection items in
the event of the failure of the drawee or collecting bank. Prom-
inent in this type of legislation is the Uniform Bank Collection
Code drafted by the counsel for the American Bankers' Associa-
tion and adopted in eighteen states.8 Among other things, this
code provides that, -when a bank to which paper has been pre-
sented for collection, fails after having collected the items, but
before having remitted for them in cash or given an uncon-
ditional credit therefore, the assets of such drawee or collecting
bank shall be impressed with a trust to the amount of the items,
and the owner of the paper "shall be entitled to a preferential
claim... irrespective of whether the fund representing such item
or items can be traced." I While at common law the collection
of the paper was regarded as immediately transforming the col-
43 (1901); People v. Iuka State Bank of Iuka, 229 Ill. App. 4 (1923).
The majority rule, however, is contra. Farmers Bank of White Plains v.
Bailey, 221 Ky. 55, 297 S. W. 938 (1927). "Unless the facts warrant it,
application of the presumption rule (augmentation) will not be made to
property other than cash in the bank when its doors close. . . . It is not
presumed the money was converted by the bank into bills receivable or
into a deposit account with another bank or into any other form of
property." Townsend v. Athelstan Bank, 237 N. W. 356, 360 (Iowa 1931).
5 State v. Farmers' State Bank of Polk, 237 N. W. 857 (Neb. 1931);
Eastman v. Farmers' State Bank of Olivia, 175 Minn. 336, 221 N. W.
236 (1928) (burden on receiver to show no augmentation).
6 See Townsend, op. cit. supra note 2, at 993.
7 See Bogert, Failed Banks, Collection Items, and Thist Prcfcrncea
(1931) 29 MIcH. L. Rav. 545, 555. The North Carolina Statute provides
that where an item was sent for collection and remittance, and collection
was made, but there was no remittance, or the check sent in rendttance
was not paid, the item owner shall have a lien on the assets of the failed
collecting bank. N. C. Cohn ANN. (Michie, 1927) § 218 (c)-(14). Colorado
provides that drafts given by a collecting bank in payment for items shall
be entitled to a preference, and does not limit it to items sent for collec-
tion and remittance. COLO. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) c. 13, § 381-h1. South
Carolina declares all items sent for collection to be a trust fund, and
a prior lien. S. C. ACTS (1927) No. 202, § 2.
s N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 39, §§ 350-350 L. Other states
which have adopted the code are: Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mary-
land, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming.
9 N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 39, § 350-L.
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lecting agent into a simple debtor,- under the code, the agency
relation is extended to cases in which insolvency occurred after
collection. Thus the forwarder of an item would be granted
a preference when collection had been effected and remittance
made by a draft dishonored because of the subsequent failure of
the drawee bank:" Perhaps an equally significant effect of this
enactment is completely to eliminate, as a prerequisite to prior-
ity, the necessity for tracing the proceeds of the paper into cash
on hand, credits with correspondents, or other funds and thus to
permit the subjection of the entire assets of the bank to the item
owner's claim.- In support of this provision it may be said that
it increases the certainty of a section of the law which conflicting
authority had rendered chaotic.13 Theoretically it tends to facili-
tate the transferability of commercial paper. And it helps to
recompense the item owner for the additional risk to which
"direct routing" subjects him.14
On the other hand the tendency exemplified by such legislation,
together with judicial expansion of the common law preferences,
necessarily depreciates the security available to the general de-
positor in bank liquidations."s Statutory attempts to offset this
tendency by machinery adapted to the protection of this import-
10 See Citizens' Bank of PinewOod v. Bradley, 136 S. C. 511, 516, 134
S. E. 510, 511 (1926); Hecker-Jones-Jewell-Milling Co. v. Cosmopolitan
Trust Co., upra note 3, at 186, 136 N. E. at 335. Contra: Monticello
Hardware Co. v. Weston, 28 F. (2d) 672 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928); see also
Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., 88 Conn. 185, 202, 90 Atl. 369, 375
(1914) (extension of agency relation beyond collection depends on intent
of parties).
"In re Jayne & Mason, 251 N. Y. Supp. 768, (Sup. Ct. 1931); see Bank
of Republic v. Republic State Bank, 42 S. W. (2d) 27, 31 (Mo. 1931).
"Apparently this result is not assured unless the tracing requirement
is specifically and expressly eliminated by the statute. Thus in Wachovia
Bank & Trust Company v. People's Bank of Darlington, U. S. Daily,
Sept. 13, 1930, at 2165, it was held that the South Carolina statute, creat-
ing a trust for the benefit of collection items but making no provision
regarding identification (supra note 7), was not applicable when thoro
had been no augmentation of assets.
13 See Legis. (1929) 43 HARv. L. REv. 307, 311.
14 See Turner, Bank Collections-The Direct Routing Pr aotio (1930) .;i9
YALE L. J. 468, 485 et seq.
is In a letter opposing the passage of a bill providing that transferors
for collection of negotiable instruments drawn against the delivery of an
accompanying document of title, Secretary of the Treasury Mellon said,
"Thus the passage of the bill would create a preference from the mere
fact of collection of the proceeds regardless of whether or not such pro-
ceeds were afterwards traceable to the hands of the receiver. This is
clearly unjust to the general creditors. The assets of the general creditors
should not be taken for the purpose of preferring a creditor whoso prop-
erty is not included within said general assets." HEARINas B nroR1 TII
COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY in H. R. 5634, pp. 71-72 (May
16, 1930) ; cf. Bogert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 563.
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ant class of interests have, in general, met with small success.
Thus the Depositor's Guaranty Funds proved inadequate to meet
the very emergencies for which they were provided, and in all
but one of the states which had installed them they have been
repealed. 6 Likewise, any extensive attempts to protect depositors
by requiring a bond to be given by banks for this purpose would
probably be foredoomed to failure. Though it has been stated
that, "The statistics of bank mortality are now ample for a com-
putation of the risk assumed in such underwriting",' 7 it would
seem that the experience of the last few years might be regarded
as complete refutation of this possibility. The collapse of the
Guaranty Funds has left the interests of the general depositor
unprotected in most jurisdictions except for the more general
guards afforded by governmental examination of banks,'5 ade-
quate reserve requirements, 9 and the preservation of a minimum
ratio between capital and deposits.20
The typical bank liquidation statute, however, either makes
no mention of the order in which the assets of defunct banks
shall be disbursed, ' or provides merely for pro caft distribu-
tion.22 In either case priorities are generally meted out accord-
ing to the established chancery rule.3 A number of legislatures
16 For an exhaustive analysis and history of the Guaranty Fund Laws
see Butts, Guaranty of Bank Deposits in Eight States (1920) 3 MIss. L. J.
186.
3. WHrU, MONEY AND BANKING (4th ed. 1911) 480.
3.s This is sometimes effected by requiring a certain number of verified
reports from bank officials. 42 STAT. 1067 (1922), 12 U. S. C. § 161
(1926). Sometimes there is direct examination by the superintendent of
banks. OHio GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 710-19.
9 MICH. Coup. LAWS (1929) §§ 11918, 11919; NEW YORK CONS. LWS
(Cahill, 1930) c. 3, § 112; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1927) § 220F.
20 CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1923) Act 652, § 19; Tnx. STAT. (1928)
art. 506.
21 The following statutes merely provide for distribution of assets ac-
cording to the order of a court; Aniz. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 251;
ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 724; CAL. GEN. LAWS
(Deering, 1923) Act 652, § 136; MAss. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 167, § 31;
N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 3, § 78; OnIo GEN. CODE (Page, 1926)
§ 710-98. In Kansas the order of the bank commissioner directs the pay-
ment of dividends. KAN. Rsv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 9, § 130.
2213 STAT. 115 (1864), 12 U. S. C. § 194 (1926); Ky. STAT. (Carrol,
1930) § 165 a-17. A Connecticut statute carefully describes the order in
vhich assets shall be disbursed. The enactment thus marshals the claims:
(1) to liquidation expenses; (2) to redemption of circulating notes; (3)
to deposits; (4) sums paid in by the state for stock subscriptions, or the
school fund; (5) all other liabilities. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 3935.
See Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., szpra note 10, at 190, 90 At.
at 371.
23 Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 13 Sup. Ct. 1418 (1892); Spokane
County v. Clark, 61 Fed. 538 (C. C. D. Wash. 1894); Hallett v. Fish,
123 Fed. 201 (C. C. D. Vt. 1903); Lucas County v. Jameson, 170 Fed.
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have sought to vary this system by providing that unsecured
depositors shall have priority over all other claimants, and by
giving them a first lien on all the assets of the bank.24 But the
courts have not heretofore shown themselves kindly disposed
towards such enactments. 2 Thus, it has been held that the statu-
tory lien of the depositor is junior to that of a judgment creditor
acquired against the bank's assets before insolvency.-" Other
cases maintain that the state cannot impair a prior right be-
longing to the federal government by thus granting a preference
to depositors. 27 And recently in State v. Faimers' State Bdewn
of Polk,2 8 the Nebraska court decided that the depositor's lien
statute did not apply to the converted proceeds of a note, as
these "were never assets belonging to the bank within the mean-
ing of the statute." This last decision, by granting a preference
to the owner of the note notwithstanding the fact that the funds
on which his claim was based had never reached the receiver,
would appear to reduce materially the effectiveness of the de-
positors' lien statute. Moreover, in view of the fact that the
Collection Code expressly impresses all the assets of a defunct
bank with a trust for the benefit of item owners, it seems that
when both the Collection Code and a depositors' lien statute
have been enacted, 29 the former would take precedence, on the
ground that the trust funds do not constitute assets to which
a lien may attach.30 •
Logically the initial step in any attempt to ameliorate the
338, (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1908); Elmira Savings Bank v. Davis, 142 N. Y.
590, 37 N. E. 646 (1894); O'Brien v. Grant, 146 N. Y. 163, 40 X. E. 871
(1895). In isolated instances this type of statute has been otherwise con-
strued. Thus in Central Trust Co. of Illinois v. Hanover Trust Co., 242
Mass. 265, 268, 136 N. E. 336, 337 (1922) the court said "... the right to
preferential payments should not be implied or extended in cases arising
under this statute, one purpose of which is to insure prompt liquidation
in favor of the numerous depositors..."
24 IOWA CODE (1931) § 9239 (gives preference to depositors). NED.
CoMuP. STAT. (1929) c. 8, § 1, 102. Of.. Cons ANN. (1930) §§ 22-2003,
22-2004.
25 But they have been held constitutional and not violative of the due
process clause. Upham v. Bramwell, 105 Ore. 597, 210 Pac. 706 (1022).26Guaranty Fund Commission v. Teichmeier, 119 Neb. 387, 229 N. IV.
121 (1930).
27 Mothersead v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 22 F. (2d) 644 (C. C. A.
8th, 1927); United States v. Bliss, 40 F. (2d) 935 (D. Nob. 1930); State
v. Thurston State Bank, 237 N. W. 293 (Neb. 1931), But of. In re Cameron,
287 Pa. 560, 135 Atl. 295 (1926).
28 Supra note 5.
29 NEB. ComtP. STAT. (1929) c. 8, § 1102, c. 62, §§ 1801-1815.
30 See Spokane County v. Clark, supra note 23, at 539, where it is said,
"Money held by a bank as trustee is not part of its assets nor legally
subject to claims of its creditors." See Flint Road Cart Company v.
Stephens, 32 Mo. App. 341, 348 (1888).
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general depositor's position would be the elimination of unfair
elements in the prevailing systems for distributing the assets
of failed banking corporations. At present it is the practice of
many courts to allow a creditor who has been given collateral
for his debt 3 to prove, in the event of insolvency, the full
amount of his claim, collect ratably with the general creditors,
and then supplement these receipts by the sale of the security
to an extent necessary to constitute payment in full. - - This pro-
cedure tends unduly to favor the secured creditor at the expense
of the diminishing funds available to the general depositor."
Probably greater equality might be obtained between all claim-
ants by a more general adoption of the so-called "bankruptcy"
rule, under which a creditor either must first exhaust his security
and participate in dividends on the basis of the balance of his
claim only, or else surrender his security and receive dividends
on the full amount of his claim1
Likewise an abatement of the unreasonable advantage ac-
corded in some jurisdictions, to government claims is much to
be desired. In view of the fact that a bond is'generally required
for the protection of state deposits,3 the granting of a prefer-
ence to claims for such funds is largely superfluous. :o The only
benefit occurring from this practice accrues to the surety who,
by being subrogated to the preferential right of the state, is
31 Statutes frequently limit the power of a bank to give collateral. Some
prohibit a pledge of assets to secure a general depositor, IDAHO Szss.
LAws (1925) c. 133, § 37, although public funds are generally excluded
from the operation of this prohibition. OKLA. COIP. STAT. ANN. (Supp.
Thornton, 1926) § 5727; VA. CODE AxN. (Michie, 1930) § 4149 (49). In the
absence of statute the authorities conflict as to the permissibility of secur-
ing deposits. (1929) 77 U. PA. L. Rnv. 916.
-Aldrich v. Chemical National Bank, 176 U. S. 618, 20 Sup. Ct. 498
(1900); In re Prescott State Bank's Estate, 3 Pac. (2d) 788 (Ariz. 1931);
Imperial Irrigation District v. Wood, 292 Pac. 665 (Cal. 1931); Bates
v. Paddock, 118 Ill. 524, 9 N. E. 257 (1886); Third National Bank of
Detroit v. Haug, 82 Mich. 607, 47 N. W. 33 (1890); People v. Remington
& Sons, 121 N. Y. 328, 24 N. E. 793 (1890).
33 Citizens & Southern Bank v. Alexander, 147 Ga. 74, 92 S. E. 808
(1917); In re Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 241 Mass. 346, 136 N. E. 269 (1922);
First National Bank of Seattle v. Mansfield State Bank, 127 Wash. 475,
221 Pac. 595 (1923).
U See dissent of Mr. Justice White in Merril v. National Bank of Jack-
sonville, 173 U. S. 131, 147, 19 Sup. Ct. 360, 367 (1899).
.
5ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1931) c. 130, § 29; KY. STAT. (Carroll,
1930) § 4693; N. M. ANN. STAT. (Courtright, 1929) c. 112 § 108; N. Y.
CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 57, § 8; PA. ANN. STAT. (Purdon, 1931)
Tit. 72, c. 3, § 3791; Tmx STAT. (1928) c. 3, art 2560. Iowa provides a
sinking fund for public deposits. IOWA CODE (1931) c. 352-Al, §§ 7420-al-
7420-b12.
-3 See Arnold, An Inequitable Preference in Favior of Surety Companie
(1930) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 278, 279.
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enabled to minimize the risk which he has been paid to take."'
Thus many courts have refused entirely to recognize a prior
right in the state,38 or have held that, by requiring security,
the state has waived its prerogative. 0
Clearly, the possibility of materially improving the status of
the depositor in bank liquidations by thus eliminating established
priorities is definitely limited. Probably better results can be
obtained by restricting the resources available for preferential
payment. Thus it has been proposed, in a collection code pre-
pared for the Commission on Uniform State Laws, to limit the
rights of item owners to the relatively liquid assets of insolvent
banks.40 With the supplementary creation of a national credit
reservoir to buy up fixed and frozen assets 41 such a device might
succeed in providing funds immediately available for the pay-
ment of general unsecured depositors. Judging by the collapse
of the Guaranty Funds, however, it would seem that no such
system of deposit insurance can survive the strain resulting from
a prolonged epidemic of bank failures. The situation will never
be satisfactory until.some method is devised for strengthening
the weaker sections of the state and national banking systems.
Directed to the accomplishment of this end is the trade area
branch banking system proposed by the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency in his report for 1930.42 By permitting strong city banks
to carry their facilities to the surrounding community, this plan
attempts to establish a sound banking system in rural districts,
where during past periods of depression the banking casualties
have been greatest.43 From the point of view of the depositor
this legislation is immeasurably desirable. Although the prevail-
ing methods of distributing the assets of defunct banks leave
3 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Ottowa County National
Bank, 32 F. (2d) 368 (N. D. Okla. 1929); National Surety Company v.
Oswego State Bank of Oswego, 33 F. (2d) 221 (D. Kan. 1929); Central
Trust Company v. Bank of Mullins, 107 W. Va. 679, 150 S. E. 221 (1929),
38Andrew v. Munn, 205 Iowa 723, 218 N. W. 526 (1928); Potter v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 101 Miss. 823, 58 So. 713 (1911);
North Carolina Corporation Commission v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co.,
193 N. C. 513, 137 S. E. 587 (1927).
39 State v. Loudermilk, 23 Ariz. 574, 205 Pac. 915 (1922); National
Surety Company v. Pixton, 60 Utah 289, 208 Pac. 878 (1922).
40 See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNFORI STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS (1930) 304, 321.
41 The National Credit Corporation Plan recently initiated by President
Hoover (See N. Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1931, at 16) in order to secure "the
rediscount of banking assets, not now eligible for rediscount at the Federal
Reserve Banks, in order to assure our banks, being sound, that they may
attain liquidity in case of necessity" (N. Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1931, at 1) is
similar in form, but not in purpose, to the device suggested herein.






much room for improvement, it is only by reducing the number
of bank failures that deposit interests can be accorded a reason-
able assurance of safety.
THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE A2NTHRACITE
MIONOPOLY
IN 1924 the Temple Anthracite Coal Company, a Delaware cor-
poration organized as a holding company, acquired the control-
ling interest in two large anthracite companies. The Federal
Trade Commission charged that such stock acquisition violated
the Clayton Act,' and ordered the company to divest itself
thereof. On appeal,2 the order was reversed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the third circuit on the ground that it did
not appear that there was any "substantial lessening of com-
petition."
The case represents the most recent episode in the history
of governmental attempts to destroy monopoly in the anthracite
coal industry. The conflict began early in the present century,
when the existence of concentration in the anthracite fields was
marked by high, uniform prices, and huge railroad profits.3 All
the market outlets in the anthracite region were in the hands
of a half-dozen great, coal-producing railroads, which owned
or controlled over ninety per cent of the total anthracite re-
sources, and produced seventy-five per ce2it of the annual ton-
nage. By 1900, substantial agreements had been reached as to
the percentage of tonnage to be carried by each road, the market
price, and the price to be paid for coal purchased from indepen-
dent operators.4
The need for regulation of the monopoly became apparent in
the case of New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad v. Intcr-
state. Commerce Commission.2 The New Haven Railroad had
co-tracted to buy coal from the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad at
a price which was less than the purchase cost, the cost of de-
livery, and the published freight rate. The Chesapeake con-
tended that the alleged rate discrimination was merely "appar-
ent," as the real consideration for the agreement was the liquida-
tion of a debt owed to the New Haven, but a decree granting
an injunction against enforcing the contract was affirmed. The
possibilities, as shown by this case, of rate discrimination
'38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1926).
251 F. (2d) 656 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931).
s For a detailed history of the anthracite monopoly, see Joxrs, Ti
ANTHRAcrTE COBBINATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1914).
4Ibid. c. 4.
5 200 U. S. 361, 26 Sup. Ct. 272 (1906).
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through railroad ownership of the goods transported wore
thoroughly alarming. The then prevailing climate of opinion
also led to the sentiment that anything resembling a trust should
be incontinently "busted," in order that competition might have
free rein. The result was the incorporation into the Hepburn
Act 6 of the commodities clause, which prohibited the transpor-
tation in interstate commerce by any railroad of goods which
it had manufactured, mined, or produced; which it owned in
whole or in part; or in which it had any interest, direct or in-
direct.
The first test of the clause " was made in United States v.
Delaware & Hudson Company.8 The defendant railroads con-
tended that the clause contravened the Fifth AmendmentY The
government argued for a broad interpretation which would
serve to prohibit the carriers from dealing in the gpods which
they transported. The Supreme Court, although not insensible
to the power of the railroads, was faced by the realization that
if the clause were held unconstitutional all further attempts at
legislative control would be effectively blocked. Mr. Justice
White successfully avoided, however, the "grave constitutional
questions" "I by interpreting the clause as prohibiting transpor-
tation by railroads in interstate commerce of (1) articles manu-
factured, etc., by the carriers and from which they had not dis-
sociated themselves prior to transportation, (2) articles owned
in whole or in part by the carrier, and (3) articles in which
the carrier at the time of transportation, has some interest,
in a legal or equitable sense, "not including, therefore, articles
manufactured, mined, produced or owned by a bona fide corpo-
ration in which the railroad is a stockholder." The clause, thus
construed, is not applicable where the railroad itself mines and
then sells the coal, or where the coal is mined and owned by
one of its subsidiaries. The result is the setting up of an elab-
orate system of purgatorial rites, whereby the offender may .be
6 34 STAT. 584 (1906), 49 U. S. C. 1 (8) (1926).
7See Lewis, The Commodity Clause of the Hepburn Act (1908) 21 HIM.
L. REV. 595, written before the Hudson case, infra note 8. The clause was
directed primarily against the anthracite roads.
8 213 U. S. 366, 29 Sup. Ct. 527 (1908).
0 See Hand, The Commodities Clause (1908) 22 HARV. L. REV. 250.
10 The grave questions, as seen by Mr. Justice White, were first, whether
the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce gives authority
to prohibit the production of the commodity, not because of some inherent
quality, but because it may begome the subject of interstate commerce;
and second, if that power does not so extend, whether a railroad can be
prohibited from carrying the commodity in interstate commerce because,
prior to transportation, it mined or produced it. Subsequent events showed
that it would have been better had the Court squarely met the consti-
tutional problems involved in the commodities clause, instead of attempting
to sidestep the issue.
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cleansed with a minimum of discomfort. The upholding of the
clause's constitutionality, after its force had been completely
nullified, left to the champions of free competition only a pyrrhic
Victory.13
In United States v. Lehigk Valley R. R., - the Court retreated
from its stand in the Hudson case, and held that where the ob-
vious reason for the ownership of coal company stock by the
railroad was to evade the commodities clause, the railroad was
to be considered as having a definite interest in the coal trans-
ported. Upon the heels of this decision, came the device of or-
ganizing a coal company, controlled through stock ownership
by the railroad, which contracted to "buy" from the railroad
all coal produced or acquired by it. The railroad, in Uqzitcd Statcs
v. Delaware, Lackxwamw. & Wester R. R.,13 loudly protested
that the coal transported had been sold to the coal company
before leaing the mines. The Supreme Court, however, held
this also a violation of the clause.
The next step was the creation of a coal company, owned by
the railroad, and a sales company, the stock of wich was owned
by the individual shareholders of the railroad. The sales com-
pany contracted to buy all the coal produced by the coal company.
The coal was then carried to tidewater by the railroad. The
Court,, in United States v. LehIgh Valley R. R.,24 held not only
that the contract of sale was a violation of the commodities
clause, the sales company being neither an independent buyer
nor a free agent, but that the corporate combination constituted
a violation of the Sherman Act."5
During this period from 1908 to 1920, suits were also insti-
tuted against anthracite coal companies charging violatfins of
the anti-trust laws. The main source of complaint was the small,
independent producers of -coal, who, since the anthracite rail-
roads controlled every outlet to tidewater, were forced either
to pay prohibitive freight rates, or to sell their coal to the rail-
roads at a certain percentage of the market price. The rate
paid by the carriers was uniform, and until 1900, it amounted
to only 60 per cent of the market price. In that year a strike
occurred, and the miners obtained a 10 per cent increase in
wages. The independent operators threatened to cause a re-
newal of the strike by withholding the miners' wage increase
unless the percentage paid for their coal was raised. The result
"IThe opinion is bitterly criticized in Anonymous, Tho Commoditics
Clause Decision (1909) 9 COL. L. REv. 523.
12 220 U. S. 257, 31 Sup. Ct. 387 (1911).
3238 U. S. 516,-35 Sup. Ct. 873 (1915). Note (1915) 14 MICH. L. REV.
49.
'14 254 U. S. 255, 41 Sup. Ct. 104 (1920).
"9 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2 (1926).
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was a uniform rate of 65 per cent, set out in perpetual con-
tracts between the operators and the railroads. At this time,
one of the largest independent companies sought to secure the
penetration into the anthracite region of a new, competing rail-
road equipped to serve the small collieries. Alarmed by this
threat, the railroads jointly purchased the stock of the Temple
Iron Company, a small concern possessed of a broad charter,
through the agency of which they engineered the purchase of
all the stock in the independent colliery. With the support of
this mining company withdrawn, the new railroad project was
abandoned, and the monopoly was saved.16
At this juncture the government intervened and in the first
Reading case,-7 the dissolution of the combination centering
around the Temple Coal Company was secured and the 65 per
cent contracts were declared illegal. The second Reading case 1 8
was an attack upon specific combinations, against which the
charges had been dismissed without prejudice in the former
suit. The Reading Company itself was a holding company, own-
ing the controlling interest in the Reading Railway, the Read-
ing Coal Company, and the New Jersey Central, which in turn
owned a majority of shares in the Wilkes-Barre Coal Company.
The government contended that the Reading group constituted
a combination in restraint of trade, and that the transportation
in interstate commerce of coal by the Reading Railway and the
Central was a violation of the commodities clause. The Reading
combination was dissolved and the railroads were carefully seg-
regated from the coal companies under a plan of reorganization
approved by the Court. 9
The attack on the anthracite monopoly has extended over a
period of nearly twenty years. With the exception of the dis-
16 These facts appear in the record of United States v. Reading Com-
pany, 183 Fed. 427 (E. D. Pa. 1910).
17 United States v. Reading Company, 226 U. S. 324, 33 Sup. Ct. 90
(1912) affirming the decision of the lower court as to the Temple Iron
Co. transaction, and reversing as to the sixty-five per cent contracts.
18 United States v. Reading Company, 253 U. S. 26, 40 Sup. Ct. 425
(1919), aF'g in part, and rev'g in part, 226 Fed. 229 (E. D. Pa. 1915).
'9 Continental Ins. Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 156, 42 Sup. Ct.
540 (1921). The plan involved (a) imerger of the Reading Railway into
the Reading Company, the latter being prohibited from doing any business
other than that of a railroad; (b) the turning over for sale, to trustees
appointed by the court, of the central stock, to be sold to others than
shareholders in the Reading Company; (c) segregation in the same man-
ner of the Wilkes-Barre Coal Company from the Central; (d) separation
of the Reading Coal Company from the Reading Company by issuing cer-
tificates in exchange for Reading Company stock, and the creation of a
new coal company, the stock of which was issued to the old shareholders,
with the understanding that they were to divest themselves of either
the certificates or the stock.
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astmous setback in the HMdson case and the recent holding in
the Temple case, the government has been consistently victorious
in the determination of the legal issues.2" Every new device of
organization has represented a definite retreat on the part of
the combination before the advancing line of court decisions.
Yet the present situation offers small comfort to the champions
of free competition. In 1923 it was estimated that eight "rail-
road coal companies" owned 78 per ccnt of the remaining an-
thracite reserve; seven large independents controlled 9.6 pcr
cent; and the remaining 12A 'per ccnt was divided among 160
companies.21 In that year only three independent concerns mined
over a million tons.2 In 1930 there arose as the result of mergers
two companies with an annual production capacity together of
fourteen million tons, Which represents nearly 25 per cent of
the total output.22 Moreover, concentration is apparent from
the inordinately high profits, out of all proportion to the costs
of mining,2-1 which have been paid to anthracite investors. In
1924 and 1925, the Glen Alden Coal Company paid dividends
of 140 per cent, and during the next four years, the investors
received 200 per cent on their capital.25
Nor has the separation of the railroads from the coal com-
panies been so complete as it would appear. True, the suits
against the combinations served to abolish crude methods of
control through interlocking directorates and direct stock own-
ership. But it has been indicated that the connection between
the railroads and the coal companies is now effected through
the medium of large banking firms.= 1 Moreover, the four largest
railroads in 1930 carried an even highef proportion of the an-
22 It is interesting to note that the lower courts, perhaps because of
proximity to the anthracite region, have never adopted such stringent
measures against the monopoly as has the Supreme Court in its reviews
of the cases.
2 1 LAIDL=R, CONCENTRATION IN A uLRICAN IDUSTRIY (1931) 55.
22Ibid. 56.
23 The 1930 production of one of these companies, the Glen Alden, as
estimated from Poon, INDUSTRALTS (1931), was over eleven million tons.24 Although there are no very accurate data on the costs of mining today,
and although the costs have increased because of added difficulty in ex-
tracting the coal, it is highly improbable that there has been the -harp
increase necessary to justify present prices.2: RoCnESTR, LABOR AND COAL (1931) 43. It is charged by this author,
though -with no authority, that the Hudson Coal Company, wvhose stock
is owned by the Delaware and Hudson Railroad, earned for the latter
in 1928 a profit of $12 a share, although operating, according to its own
books, at a "loss" of $1,400,000.
26 BOGEN, THE ANTHRACIrn RAno.LDS (1927) 240. "Since the 'segrega-
tion' in 1923, the coal mining company (Phila. & Reading) has been dis-
tinct, tied to J. P. Morgan & Company, who also control the Reading,
but with the operations of the coal company technically separate from
other interests." ROCHESTER, op. cit. upra note 25.
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thracite tonnage than was carried by them in 1908, and the
proportion carried by each was substantially the same as in
1908.27 This may be partially explained by the fact that the
geographical advantage of each railroad has remained un-
changed, but it seems significant that the tonnage has not been
reduced by the expected competition from new roads.
It can thus be gathered that free competition is still nothing but
an ideal in the anthracite fields. In view of the modern tendency
toward concentration,28 and in view of the small, compact area
containing anthracite resources, 21 the choice of monopoly over
competition seems inevitable. Attempts to destroy the monopoly
by separation of the coal companies from the railroads do not
seem to have been well chosen, for it difficult to see how this
could have restored competition among the coal companies them-
selves. The efforts at destruction seem also to have been ineffec-
tive, for although the law has consistently triumphed, the situa-
tion has remained noticeably unchanged, and the same objections
to the organization of the anthracite industry are as valid today
as they were thirty years ago.
The first chapter of anthracite regulation opened with the
government's defeat in the Hudson case, and closed with the
monopolists still in control 0 And the second chapter (also in-
augurated by governmental defeat in the Temple case) promises
to reach the same conclusion. But even in the face of the mon-
opolistic evils which plague the industry at present, one cannot
fail to rejoice at the defeat of free competition. The most casual
survey of the kindred field of bituminous reveals the "spotted
actuality" of the competitive ideal,31 and it is to be doubted
whether the introduction into anthracite of unfettered competi-
tion would solve the problems of wages, profits, and price. Iow-
ever, if competition must be had in all events, it might be well
to adopt the suggestion of one eminent authority, that a subsidy
of $1,000,000 be appropriated for the development of a smoke-
less bituminous.
27 The comparison was made from the tonnage figures of 1908, as ap.
pearing in JONES, op. cit. supra note 4, at 148, and the tonnage figures
for 1930 as computed from POOR, RAILROADS (1931).
28 One predisposing factor in anthracite is the complete unionization of
the industry, which would tend to bring the operators into closer coopera-
tion.
29 See GILBERT & POGUE, AMuERICA'S POWER RESOURCES (1921) c. 3.
30 Perhaps it is significant that the dissolution suits ceased with the
advent of Harry M. Daugherty to the attorney-generalship.
The difficulties of competition in the bituminous field are admirably
set out in HA1LTON AND WRIGHT, THE CASE OF BITUMINOUS COAL (1926).
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JURISDICTION OF BANKRUPTCY COURT OVER FORE-
CLOSURE IN OTHER COURTS OF MORTGAGES ON
BANKRUPT'S PROPERTY
As a result of judicial intermixture of fictional concepts and
practical demands, jurisdictional questions relating to the en-
forcement of mortgage liens against bankrupt mortgagors have
been the source of abundant conflict of decisions and endless con-
fusion.' It is established that upon adjudication in bankruptcy
the title and right to possession of all of the bankrupt's property
wherever it may be found 2 vests from the time of the filing of
the petition 3 in the trustee subject to the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court. 4 There is also some consistency in the princi-
ples governing the procedure of enforcement of mortgage liens
by the bankruptcy court upon application by the mortgagee.5
Discord arises, however, in the event of an attempt by a lienor
'5 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (3d ed. 1923) c. 23; GBERT'S COLLIER ON
BANKRUPrcy (2d ed. 1931) 502-549. Cf., for a general discussion on con-
flicting jurisdiction between federal and state courts in bankruptcy, Note
(1928) 42 HARv. L. REV. 119.2 The Bankruptcy Act, section 2, as amended in 1910, authorized ancillary
proceedings by all courts of bankruptcy in aid of a receiver or trustee ap-
pointed in proceedings pending in any other court of bankruptcy. 36 STAT.
838, 839 (1910), 11 U. S. C. § 11 (20) (1926).
3 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 110 (1926); Robertson v. Howard,
229 U. S. 254, 33 Sup. Ct. 854 (1913).
4Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, 22 Sup. Ct. 269 (1902). In enforcing
this custody by injunction, as discussed infra, the bankruptcy courts rely
upon Section 2, -which generally defines the powers of the bankruptcy
courts, and particularly par. 15, which authorizes issuance of such orders
as are necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act. 30 STAT.
545 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 11 (20) (1926).
Cf. In re Hasie, 206 Fed. 789 (N. D. Tex. 1913), for a short summary
of ordinary foreclosure procedure in bankruptcy court.
The trustee takes only the bankrupt's title and the property remains
subject to all valid preexisting liens by Section 57 of the Bankruptcy Act.
The mortgagee may apply to the bankruptcy court for sale of the mort-
gaged property, the proceeds to be credited on his debt, and file claim
entitling him to the status of a general creditor in case of deficit on the
sale by virtue of general order 28 of the United States Supreme Court.
18 Sup. Ct. VIII. The trustee and bankruptcy court may refuse to ad-
minister the property if it should appear that the entire value of the
property is insufficient to pay off the incumbrance. Cf. In re Keet, 128 Fed.
651, 652 (M. D. Pa. 1903). Or it may conduct the sale free of lien in
case the lien is not redeemed. In re Cutler, 228 Fed. 771 (E. D. N. C.
1916). The failure of the mortgagee to file any claim or appear in the
bankruptcy court only defeats his status as an unsecured creditor and does
not affect his right to rely upon his security and reclaim the proceeds of
the lien from the sale by the bankruptcy court. Yeateman v. Institu-
tion, 95 U. S. 764 (1877); Ward v. Bank of Ironton, 202 Fed. 609 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1913) ; see In re Goldsmith, 118 Fed. 763, 766 (N. D. Texas 1902).
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to enforce the security outside the bankruptcy court, when it
becomes necessary to determine the extent of the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction. This question may be decisive (1) when a
foreclosure suit has been instituted in another court, usually a
state court, before the petition; 6 (2) where foreclosure proceed-
ings are commenced after the petition in a state court with the
consent of the bankruptcy court; 7 (3) where such consent is
not secured to a foreclosure in another court; 8 (4) whore there
is a power of sale mortgage,9 and also (5) where there is a
pledge of personalty with a power of sale.")
When the decision in Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie and Timber Co. 1
was handed down by the Supreme Court last spring, its effect
upon foreclosure practice in these situations became a subject
of widespread conjecture and some trepidation.'" The actual
decision was not startling, merely providing the trustee with
another procedural device, plea in abatement, for checking a
foreclosure action instituted in the state court after the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy. 3 But in the course of the opinion
it was said:
"When this jurisdiction has attached the court's possession
cannot be affected by actions in other courts.... Thus while valid
liens existing at the time of the commencement of a bankruptcy
proceeding are preserved, it is solely within the power of the
court of bankruptcy to ascertain their validity and amount and
to decree thd method of liquidation.... The exercise of this func-
tion necessarily forbids interference with it by foreclosvre pro-
ceedings in other courts. .. ."
These statements, if literally interpreted, might serve as a basis
for nullifying all foreclosure proceedings outside the court of
bankruptcy, 4 endanger all land titles thereby obtained, and ne-
cessitate radical changes in present foreclosure practice.
The fate of mortgage foreclosure proceedings begun in state
G In re Marts, 38 F. (2d) 283 (D. N. J. 1930).
7See In re Zehner, 193 Fed. 787) 790 (E. D. La. 1912).
8 In re Dyer, 8 F. (2d) 376 (D. N. J. 1924).
9Robinson v. Kay, 7 F. (2d) 576 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
10 In re Southern Pharmaceutical Co., 286 Fed. 148 (E. D. Tenn. 1921).
11282 U. S. 734, 51 Sup. Ct. 270 (Feb. 24, 1931) ; (1931) 31 CoL. L. RuV.
1036, (1931) 16 MINN. L. RB,. 94.
12 Rintels, Mortgage Foreclosure under the Hobbs Caso, Commercial Law
Journal, July, 1931, at 337; Parsons, National Titleman, June, 1931; Isaacs,
Credit Executive, May, 1931; Cranmer, American Bankruptcy Review, Aug.,
1931; also see Journal of the National Ass'n of Referees in Bankruptcy,
July, 1931 at 175.
13 The usual method of accomplishing the same result is by injunction
issued by the bankruptcy court.
14 Rintels, op. cit. supra note 12.
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courts prior to bankruptcy brings the concept of bankruptcy
jurisdiction into relief against the more general principle of
comity that the court first acquiring jurisdiction over the parties
and subject matter should not be interfered with.2G It has never
been supposed that the jurisdiction of the state court could be
defeated by the bankruptcy of the mortgagor in the absence of
a stay by the bankruptcy court.2' Nor is it doubted that the bank-
ruptcy court may always temporarily restrain the state court
action pending the appointment of a trustee to assume the place
of the bankrupt.17 But whether the bankruptcy court is em-
powered permanently to enjoin the continuance of foreclosure
proceedings begun before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
or whether, if it have the power, it will be inclined to enjoin
at the request of the trustee, is difficult to determine from the
previous decisions.18 In some instances injunctions have been
granted expressly on the theory of the exclusive and paramount
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. ° Some of these cases either
expressly or impliedly ground their injunction on the fact that
at the time of petition or injunction the state court had no actual
possession of the property.20 In another early federal decision,
3
5 Pickens v. Roy, 187 U. S. 127, 23 Sup. Ct. 73 (1902); Alurphy v.
Hofman Co., 211 U. S. 562, 29 Sup. Ct. 154 (1909).
u Friedman v. Zweifler, 74 illisc. 448, 132 N. Y. Supp. 320 (Sup. Ct.
1911) (action for goods sold and delivered); Hobbs v. Head & Dawst Co.,
184 Fed. 409 (C. C. A. 5th, 1911) (mechanic's lien).
- In re Morse, 210 Fed. 900 (N. D. N. Y. 1914) ; cf. In re Emslie, 102
Fed. 292 (C. C. A. 2d, 1900).
18 Cases denying injunction: In re Rohrer, 117 Fed. 381 (C. C. A. 6th,
1910); In re Wagner's Estate, 206 Fed. 364 (E. D. Penn. 1913); In re
Schmidt, 224 Fed. 814 (D. N. J. 1915). Cases allowing injunction: In re
Dana, 167 Fed. 529 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909); First Savings Bank & Trust Co.
v. Butler, 282 Fed. 866 (C. C. A. Sth, 1922); In re Kaplan, 144 Fed. 159
(N. D. Ga. 1905).
The same conflict ensues in regard to judgment and attachment liens.
Cf. Straton v. New, infra note 29, footnote 6. The jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court is supplemented in these cases by the power to enjoin the en-
forcement of any lien created in state court legal proceedings within four
months of the bankruptcy petition while the bankrupt was insolvent. Clarke
v. Larremore, 188 U. S. 846, 23 Sup. Ct. 363 (1902). Cf. RE=INGTON, OP.
cit. supra note 1, at 115 et seq.
- Loisel v. Dornier, 213 Fed. 396 (E. D. La. 1914), aff'd Pugh v. Loisel,
219 Fed. 417 (C. C. A. 5th, 1915); First Savings Bank & Trust Co. v.
Butler, supra note 17, at 868; In re Knight, 125 Fed. 35 (W. D. Ky. 1903)
(holding that bankruptcy court will have exclusive jurisdiction over any
property sequestrated by the state court within four months). Cf. Coal
Land Co. v. Ruffner, 165 Fed. 881 (C. C. A. 4th, 1908); Bothwell v. Fitz-
gerald, 219 Fed. 408 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915); (1931) 16 MINN. L. REV. 94.
20In re Dana, supra note 18 (state court receiver had voluntarily sur-
rendered possession of property in. question to bankruptcy court at time
of the injunction); First Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Butler, smpra note
18 (no actual possession taken by the state court receiver until after
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the court, while refusing to enjoin, looked upon the granting
of the injunction purely as a matter of discretion to be governed
by a consideration of the equity of unsecured creditors and the
danger thereto in state court proceedings.21
The opposing and preponderant authority22 however, disap-
prove the paramount and exclusive jurisdiction theory in favor
of one of concurrent jurisdiction, but it is not clear whether they
refuse to allow interference as a matter of comity or absolutely
deny the power to the bankruptcy court.23 Furthermore, there is
doubt whether a constructive possession by the state court ac-
quired by commencement of the foreclosure action, with juris-
diction of the parties and the subject matter, is sufficient 4 to
preclude interference, or whether actual possession by the re-
ceiver 25 at the time of the petition is necessary.24 A recent
adjudication in bankruptcy although foreclosure action was begun before
filing of petition).
21In re Holloway, 93 Fed. 638 (D. C. Ky. 1899). Cf. In re United
Graphite Co., 161 Fed. 583 (E. D. Pa. 1908).
22 Cases cited in Straton v. New, infra note 29, at footnote 6.
23 See Bean v. American Trust & Savings Bank, 271 S. W, 1111, 1114
(1925); see Hooks v. Aldridge, 145 Fed. 865 (C. C. A. 5th, 1906). It
should be noted that the so-called paramount and exclusive jurisdiction
theory is dominant in situations in which the bankruptcy court has prior
custody due to possession in the bankrupt at the time of bankruptcy, when
no state foreclosure action is pending. Cf. note 43, infra. Furthermore,
suits to enforce liens acquired by legal proceedings within four months,
suits with regard to general assignments for the benefit of creditors within
four months, and state insolvency proceedings over which the power of the
bankruptcy court is paramount, must be distinguished from the cases In-
volving foreclosure of mortgage liens.
2 4 Bryan v. Speakman, No. 6288. C. C. A. 5th, Nov. 2, 1931. The court
held that the jurisdiction to adjudicate concerning the subject matter of
and the issues arising in the suit filed to foreclose a specific mortgage
lien, the validity of which was in doubt, was acquired by the state court
when the complaint was sanctioned and filed. Thereafter, as long as the
cause was prosecuted no other court could interfere with the ces, and a
state court receiver actually appointed after bankruptcy had intervened
was held entitled to possession as against the bankruptcy receiver pre-
viously in possession.
This case reversed the district court decision denying possession to the
state court receiver because all subsequent proceedings in the state court
would be forbidden since the bankruptcy court was the court of primary
jurisdiction in whom, according to Isaacs v. Hobbs, was the ultimate deci-
sion as to validity. In re Lookout Mountain Hotel Co., 50 F. (2d) 421
(N. D. Ga. 1931).
The circuit court pointed out that Isaac v. Hobbs did not support these
conclusions since it applied to actions commenced in other courts after the
bankruptcy petition and that in the case at bar the state court had begun
the action before bankruptcy.
25 The status of the state court receiver is often of prime importance. HIe
ranks as an adverse claimant who cannot be ordered summarily to sur-
render the bankrupt's property where he was appointed before the petition
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case 27 denied, however, the operative effect of any actual pos-
session theory that may be implicit in the cases. A well con-
sidered state court opinion 28 recognizing the whole question of
intervention as unsettled by the Federal Supreme Court, stated
the ordinary rule to be that the state court should not be stayed
particularly when property is in its actual possession.
That Isaacs v. Hobbs marks no radical departure from this
particular mortgage foreclosure practice is apparent from the
more recent decision of the Supreme Court in Straton v. Ncr.y
There it was held that a creditor's suit to enforce a valid judg-
ment lien filed in a state court was not affected by a bankruptcy
petition filed five and one half months later and that the court
of bankruptcy had no jurisdiction to enjoin the proceeding. Mr.
Justice Roberts, author of the opinion in the Hobbs case, clearly
indicated that the weight of federal authority was that the
bankruptcy court could not enjoin the enforcement of a valid
lien more than four months old in any proceeding brought prior
of bankruptcy in an action to foreclose a mortgage lien. In re Iroquois
Utilities, Inc., 297 Fed. 397 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
Ordinarily a state court receiver may be divested of possession of the
property by order of the bankruptcy court if he was appointed as receiver
for the benefit of creditors in insolvency proceedings within four months
of bankruptcy. Cf. REMINGTON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 117 ct scq. Note
(1929) 14 MINN. L. REv. 638. But if he is appointed in a suit to enforce
a lien with incidental prayer for general insolvency, he is not divested of
the assets covered by the lien but may hold them for foreclosure. Carling
v. Seymour Lumber Co., 113 Fed. 483 (C. C. A. 5th, 1902). See In re
Rathman, 183 Fed. 913, 923 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910).
26 In First Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Butler, supra note 18, it is held
by implication that the institution of a foreclosure suit in the state court
before the filing of the petition where the state court does not appoint a
receiver until after adjudication though before the appointment of the
trustee in bankruptcy, is not such a taking of custody of the rcs as will
prevent the bankruptcy court from interference.
Cf. In re Wills, 114 Fed. 222 (W. D. Mo. 1902). The court applied the
physical possession test to refuse an injunction against prosecution of
replevin in a state court action begun after the filing of the petition but
before adjudication, before any bankruptcy officer actually took possession
or any restraining order was applied for.
27 See Bryan v. Speakman, supra note 24. Any rule allowing the bank-
ruptcy court Yo intervene in event it received actual possession after the
filing of the foreclosure suit seems unsound realistically since there would
be less danger of a loss to the unsecured creditors by state court action
when the trustee was actually present so as to be in actual possession than
when there was no possession and inertia or absence of trustee might be
dangerous.
28 Bean v. American Trust & Savings Bank, supra note 23. The court
expressed the feeling that in case of such an injunction against the parties
proceeding in the state court, the place of appeal is to a higher federal
court and a counter injunction by a state court should be refused as
causing an unseemly conflict of jurisdiction.
29283 U. S. 318, 51 Sup. Ct. 465 (April 20, 1931).
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to the filing of the petition 0 And in reliance on this case a subse-
quent federal decision 31 upheld the foreclosure of a mortgage
lien in a state court brought five months before bankruptcy. The
preponderant policy of non-interference thus recognized appears
desirable because it avoids conflicts of jurisdiction 2 and the
additional costs and delay resulting from new proceedings.
Bankruptcy courts sometimes consent to delegate their juris-
diction to foreclose mortgage liens on property in their possession
to state courts 33 when the trustee is joined as a party defendant
in the state action. This consent, a discretionary matter with
the bankruptcy court,34 may be refused regardless of the in-
creased costs of proceeding in the bankruptcy court35 and is
often denied for the protection of a probable equity of unsecured
creditors. " Yet the availability of the device enables the bank-
ruptcy court to rid itself of onerous proceedings," transfer fore-
closure proceedings for distant property to a court conveniently
located at the situs of the res,38 and save additional costs that the
bankruptcy court proceeding might involve.30 The fear that
Isaacs v. Hobbs denied the power so t6 consent 40 was removed by
30 See Straton v. New, supra note 29 at 331, 51 Sup. Ct. at 470.
31 Russell v. Edmondson, 50 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 5th, May 29, 1931).
Accord: McGonigle v. Foutch, 51 F. (2d) 455 (C. C. A. 8th, June 8, 1931)
(mechanic's lien over four month's old and the foreclosure of the lien begun
within four months of bankruptcy). See Bryan v. Speakman, supra note 24.
32 See Hooks v. Aldridge, supra note 23, at 865. This court feels that
extreme care should be exercised in any intervention and the principles of
comity should be recognized if practicable.
33 In re San Gabriel Sanatorium Co., 111 Fed. 892 (C. C. A. 9th, 1901);
McHenry v. La Soci~t6 Francaise D' Eparguis, 95 U. S. 58 (1877)1 see
In re Zehner, infra note 35, at 789.
34 In re Southern Florida Realty Co., 15 F. (2d) 171 (S. D. Fla. 1926).
35 In re Zehner, 193 Fed. 787 (E. D. La. 1912). However, the court at-
tempts to refute these objections on ground that equivalent costs are re-
quired in state court proceedings and admits that a more forceful argu-
ment might be made in case the mortgagee had a right to enter and
sell without judicial proceedings. Cf. In re Stewart, 193 Fed. 791 (B. D.
La. 1912) (coficerning whether costs of sale should be taken out of pro-
ceeds where there is a deficiency)..
36 In re Zehner, supra note 35; In re Southern Florida Realty Co., smpra
note 34.
37 Cf. In re Hasie, supra note 5, at 792.
38 The economic disadvantage of compelling a mortgagee to intervene in
litigation far away from his home (in federal district court of his state
with ancillary jurisdiction or in the bankruptcy court) to protect an invest-
ment of purely local character is a material consideration.
39 Practicing attorneys have registered decided objections to the impli-
cations of the Hobbs case because they would cut off opportunity of
avoiding by state court foreclosure the costs that are necessarily entailed
in bankruptcy court foreclosure.
40 See Cranmer, American Bankruptcy Review, supra note 12; see also
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subsequent federal decisions upholding the power.4'
Where a foreclosure action has been commenced in a state
court after the petition in bankluptcy, and the consent of the
bankruptcy court to such action is not obtained, different prob-
lems arise. As a matter of constant practice foreclosure pro-
ceedings are often initiated and completed in state courts with-
out any formal consent of the bankruptcy court by simply join-
ing and notifying the trustee. If he submits to the action, title
passing at the foreclosure sale is not questioned.42  But if ie
objects to the state action and petitions for an injunction, it is
clearly within the power of the bankruptcy court to enjoin fore-
closure proceedings against property in the actual possession of
the bankrupt at the time of the petition. 3 These injunctions
may be preliminary to a sale by the bankruptcy court 4 or to an
investigation of the proceeding by the trustee, and are usually
responsive to a petition by the trustee based on the existence of
the equity of unsecured creditors.3 One court refused to uphold
a perpetual injunction, modifying the order to one for a reason-
able time with leave to the mortgagee to appeal in case of an
unreasonable delay by the banlruptcy court!0  Another court
in the presence of a claimed equity, while admitting its power,
refused to enjoin the state action, and endorsed the policy of
non-intervention except when necessary for protection of the
equity, believing the remedy of trustee joinder in the state court
action to be normally sufficientY.4
It has been held that a mortgage foreclosure sale after bank-
ruptcy without the consent of the banlauptcy court and joinder
of the trustee as party defendant is illegal and that the trustee
Isaacs, Credit Executive, supra note 12: "Under this decision the bank-
ruptcy courts are held powerless to divide the responsibility of administer-
ing encumbered property with other courts... Banluptcy courts cannot
surrender their control of the assets to other courts...!
41In re 'Schulte United, Inc., 50 F. (2d) 243 (S. D. N. Y. March 24,
1931); In re Parrino, 50 F. (2d) 613 (E. D. N. Y. May 23, 1931). See
Straton v. New, supra note 29, at 321, 51 Sup. CL at 466; In re Wakey,
50 F. (2d). 869, 870 (C. C. A. 7th, June 29, 1931).
-1 See First Trust Co. v. Baylor, 1 F. (2d) 24, 27 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924);
see Ward v. Bank of Ironton, 202 Fed. 609, 612 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913).
43 In re Larkin, 252 Fed. 885 (D. Alass. 1918) (property in possession
of bankruptcy receiver); In re Dyer, 8 F. (2d) 376 (D. N. J. 1924)
(Trustee and court admittedly had possession of the property from time
of bankruptcy); In re Pittelkow, 92 Fed. 901 (E. D. Wis. 1899); First
Trust Co. v. Baylor, supra note 42. See cases cited in Isaas v. Hobbs,
supra note 11.
In re Booth, 96 Fed. 943. (N. D. Ga. 1899) ; In re Dyer, aupra note 43.
45 See cases in notes 43 and 44, supra.
46 First Trust Co. v. Baylor, supra note 42.
-' In re Porter, 109 Fed. 111 (D. Ky. 1901).
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may recover the property.48 But failure to join the trustee as a
party defendant may particularize this holding. Nevertheless
the dictum in Isaacs v. Hobbs has been hailed as invalidating any
title passing in this type of action.40 Another view is that con-
sent can be implied from the failure to intervene and that the
Hobbs case only suggests that formal consent be obtained.-' But
a subsequent case 1 involving a different fact set-up has inter-
preted the Hobbs case as nullifying action in the state courts
unless consent of the bankruptcy court has first been obtained.
This interpretation, removing as it does from the trustee the
burden of interference, would effectuate the general policy of
protecting the unsecured creditors by eliminating to some extent
the danger of a sacrificial sale and dissipation of the equity of
redemption which might follow from a failure of the trustee to
resist.
Mortgages issued with a power of sale on default are peculiar
in that they entail no conflicting court jurisdiction. Two cases "
have upheld the right of the holder of the power of sale to
exercise it on default after bankruptcy without the consent of the
bankruptcy court. Two cases allow an injunction before sale,"
a third orders surrender of the security deed, " while a fourth
denies the trustee of the deed of sale rents and profits from the
land on the ground that a sale without the consent of the bank-
ruptcy court is void." Varying theories support these diversified
results. The view that the power of sale is a contract right 67
to be cut across only in case of its fraudulent utilization "I con-
trasts with that fixing it as a remedy which can be impaired by
the administration of the bankruptcy court without affecting
the contract." Cases upholding the power also utilize a theory
of possession, claiming that a notice of sale posted prior to the
48 In re Brooks, 91 Fed. 508 (D. Nev. 1898). (Court here ordered return
of property to trustee calling the sale illegal.)
49 See Cranmer, op. cit. supra note 12.
50 (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 1036.
51 See In re Wakey, 50 F. (2d) 869, 870 (C. C. A. 7th, June 29, 1931).
52 See Journal of Nat'l Ass'n of Referees in Bankruptcy, July, 1931, at
176.
53 In re Smith, 3 F. (2d) 40 (S. D. Tex. 1924); (deed of trust); Robin-
son v. Kay, 7 F. (2d) 576 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
54 In re Jersey Island Packing Co., 138 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. 9th, 1905)
(deed of trust); Allebach v. Thomas, 16 F. (2d) 853 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927)
(deed of trust).
55 Cohen v. Nixon & Wright, 236 Fed. 407 (S. D. Ga. 1916).
-6 In re Hasie, supra note 5.
57 In re Smith, supra note 53.
s Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U. S. 28, 27 Sup. Ct. 681 (1906) (pledge
of securities with power).
59 In re Jersey Island Packing Co., supra note 54.
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bankruptcy petition transfers constructive possession to the
mortgagee.60 On the other hand, it has been held that such pos-
session was cut across by a creditor's petition for bankruptcy
court administration before sale.61 The only realistic generaliza-
tion which can be made is that the courts will allow creditors
to cut across the power of sale to secure bankruptcy administra-
tion, but refuse to disturb the status quo where such power has
been exercised. This lines up with the result in ordinary mort-
gage situation leaving the effect of Isaacs v. Hobbs as yet unde-
terminable.
The disposition of pledged securities with a power of sale c-
after bankruptcy was a question of less difficulty prior to that
decision. The leading Supreme Court case upheld a sale after
bankruptcy by the pledgee in accordance with the power of sale
without the consent of the bankruptcy court, 3 limiting the right
of the bankruptcy court to interfere to cases of fraud or viola-
tion of the provisions of the agreement as to sale. Two lower
federal courts have refused to enjoin an exercise of the power.6
In oide case " the presence of a bankrupt's equity was alleged,
while in the other ;6 there was no mention made of the value of
the pledge as compared to the size of the lien. These cases
viewed section 57h of the Bankruptcy Act 1 as providing an
exclusive method of sale through the bankruptcy court only
in the absence of an agreement among the parties and as in no
wise limiting a power agreed upon.
Recently, however, this procedure was completely disturbed
60 See cases cited supra, note 53. The possession theory was used to
effect a transfer of deeds and tracts to the custody of the trustee after
bankruptcy in Cohen v. Nixon & Wright, svpra note 55. In that case a
state law of Georgia left the debtor in possession under a deed of trust.
6 In re Jersey Island Packing Co., supra note 54.
62 In the absence of any power of sale agreement, the bankruptcy court
may enjoin sale of the collateral on default, or order it to be turned over
to the trustee for disposition subject to the lien. See Wingert v. Kieffer,
29 F. (2d) 59, 60 _(C. C. A. 4th, 1928).63 Hiscock v. Varick Bank, supra note 58. In this case insurance policies
pledged as collateral were involved. The strength of the case is heightened
by the fact that the pledgees bought the policies on the sale and gave no
notice to the pledgor and the court failed to deny them any measure of
the deficit still remaining. Cf. (1928) 14 VA. L. REv. 223 with regard to
the power of the trustee to redeem property pledged after default.
6 4 In re Browne, 104 Fed. 762 (E. D. Pa. 1900); In re Mayer, 157 Fed.
836 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907). See In re Pinkett, Douglas & Co., 50 F. (2d)
435, 439 (S. D. Cal. Mar. 30, 1931).
65 In re Browne, supra note 64.
66 In re Mayer, supra note 64. In several other cases where sale was
allowed by the pledgee the security was of less value than the lien. See
cases cited in (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. RBa. 124, footnote 7.
6730 STAT. 560 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 57h (1926).
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by a federal court decision 68 which, on the strength of the Hobbs
case, upheld an order of a referee enjoining the sale of stocks
and bonds pledged as collateral under a power of sale agreement
until the pledgee obtained the authorization of the bankruptcy
court. This case ignored all past authority except the Hobbs
case and emphasized the extension of the Hobbs rule from realty
to personalty. Such a decision imposes inevitable hardship upon
banks and other pledgees. Banks hold billions of dollars worth
of these marketable collaterals as a source of liquid assets.
Ability to dispose of them quickly after the default of a debtor in
case of abnormal cash demands or under favorable market con-
tions is essential to their safety and business technique09 The
delay and occasional difficulty incurred in gaining the consent
of the bankruptcy court would seriously delimit this ability. Like-
wise, the interest of the bankrupt's unsecured creditors in any
remaining equity may be better protected by preservation of
the pledgee's freedom to sell under favorable market conditions
than by the mythical safeguard of a bankruptcy court's consent,
That Isaacs v. Hobbs justifies or intended any such radical de-
parture from present practice is highly questionable.
Jurisdictional principles with regard to the foreclosure of
liens are not affected by questions concerning the determination
of the validity of the liens themselves. 0 The court that first
acquires jurisdiction over the res may determine all issues of
validity connected with the mortgage."' A bankruptcy court
may therefore enjoin enforcement of all invalid or undeter-
mined liens on property within the possession of the bankrupt
at the time of the filing of the petition.72 When the property
is in the possession of a third party at the time of the filing of
the petition, the bankruptcy court, apparently has no power to
issue an injunction.7 3 It receives no constructive possession and
Gs In re Henry, 50 F. (2d) 453 (E. D. Pa. June 10, 1931); (1931) 80
U. OF PA. L. Ray. 124.
GO Paton, American Banker's Ass'n Journal, Sept. 1931, at 125.
70 GILBERT'S COLLIER ON" BANKRUPTCY (2d ed. 1931) pp. 502-552.
71 In re Oswegatchie Chemical Products Corp., 279 Fed. 547 (C. C. A.
2d, 1922); Karasik v. Peoples Trust Co., 241 Fed. 939 (E. D. N. Y. 1917).
The bankruptcy court may consent to a trial of validity in state court
where a state law is particularly concerned. In re Johnson, 127 Fed. 618
(D. Nev. 1904). But even where such consent has been given the bank-
ruptcy court can enjoin adverse claimant from proceeding further in the
state court action. In re Schemerhorn, 145 Fed. 341 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906).
See Bryan v. Speakman, supa note 24.2 In re Locust Bldg. Co., 272 Fed. 988 (E. D. N. Y. 1921) ; In re United
States Chrysotile Asbestos Co., 253 Fed. 294 (S. D. N. Y. 1918); In ro
Donnelly, 188 Fed. 1001 (N. D. Ohio 1910).
'I United Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Baer Co. Limited, 10 F. (2d) 153 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1925) (property was conveyed by bankrupt to his wife less than
four months before bankruptcy and not in his possession at the time of the
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the trustee's only remedy is a plenary suit to recover possession,74
over which the state and federal courts have concurrent juris-
diction,7 5 distinct from bankruptcy proceedings.
The exact bearing of Isavces v. Hobbs on this whole field of
procedural jurisdiction over mortgage foreclosure remains a
matter of speculation. The limitations placed upon its dieta by
Mr. Justice Roberts himself and their interpretation in succeed-
ing federal court decisions indicate a continuance of the previous
practices as to suits begun in state courts before the petition and
those begun after the petition with consent. The matter of a
foreclosure in a state court begun after the petition without con-
sent has not as yet been ruled upon, despite a diction in In re
Henry to the contrary.7b
Past litigation on the immediate subject discloses varied re-
sults whose ultimate end was the fair and efficient settlement
of the bankrupt's estate featured by adequate protection of the
equity of the unsecured creditors. The machinery of jurisdic-
tion in vogue seems satisfactory in its realistic and functional
results. Yet these results have been accompanied with a confus-
ing juristic rationalization, faithfully illustrated in the Hobbs
case, which has produced an abundance of costly litigation. It
is submitted that the whole problem of foreclosure of mortgages
on the bankrupt's property should be a matter within the dis-
cretion of the bankruptcy court, which could be exercised so as
to secure the most efficient and equitable settlement, in keeping
with the spirit of the Bankruptcy Act, and eliminating the pro-
cedural tangle that the present jurisdictional approach has pro-
duced.
LEGALITY OF MORTGAGE PARTICIPATIONS AS TRUST
IfNESTMENTS
SINCE the traditional delimitation of legal investments for trust
funds has tended to relieve the eligible securities of much of
the strain of competing for a market, and thus resulted in con-
sistently lower yields,' mortgages on realty, offering greater pro-
petition); Ft: Dearborn Trust & Savings Bank v. Smalley, 298 Fed. .15
(C. C. A. 8th, 1924) (property, at time of the petition, in possession of a
third party, who sued in the state court for specific performance of a
contract to sell and joined the mortgagee with the bankrupts trustees.
Mortgagee filed cross bill for foreclosure in that suit.)
74See United Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Baer Co. Limited, supra, note 73,
at .54.
15 Weidhorn v. Levy, 253 U. S. 268, 40 Sup. Ct. 534 (1920).
76 See In re Henry, supra note 68, at 454.
"Berger, Pooling or Participation Mortgages as IRvcstmCnft for Thrst
Funds (1929) 48 TRUST CoMPANIES 599.
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ductivity with equal security, have always been favored as trust
investments.2 But the high realty values frequently existing in
the large cities precluded the investment therein of small trust
funds,3 which in themselves are steadily increasing in number,
and in addition commonly remain as fractional residues after
the investment of large funds.4 In response to these exigencies,
trust companies devised plans permitting investments in mort-
gage participations.5 In elementary form the plan involves an
allocation of undivided interests either in one mortgage or in a
gfoup of pooled mortgages held by the trustee to trust funds in
its hands., A more complex plan is introduced when one trust
company holds the mortgages, and not only assigns undivided
interests to trust funds in its own hands but also sells certificates
of participation in which other trustees may invest their trust
funds.7 From these two basic plans innumerable variations pro-
ceed.
The widespread adoption of mortgage participation plans by
outstanding trust companies undoubtedly argues for their legal-
ity.8 But the paucity of cases and the divergence of opinidn
among lawyers,0 as well as the palpable differences existing be-
tween various forms of participation plans, render any general-
ized prediction uncertain.1 °
2 By the English common law rule, adopted in many states, only real
property and government obligations were considered proper investments.
See Simmons v. Oliver, 74 Wis. 633, 636, 43 N. W. 561, 562 (1889).
3 See The Handling of Small Estates and Trusts (1930) 50 TRUST COM-
PANIES 684.
4 Sisson, Survey Reveals Another Record Year for Trust Business (1930)
50 TRUST COMPANIES 199; Miller, Allocation of Small Trust Balances to
Mortgages and Bonds (1930) 50 TRUST COMPANIES 581; of. Duffy, Sys-
tematic Review and Analysis of Trust Investments (1930) 50 TRUST COM-
PANIES 899.
5'See editorial comment in (1929) 48 TRUST COMPANIES 718; Chandler
New Problems and Solutions in Investment of Trust Funds (1928) 47
TRUST COMPANIES 621; LORING, A TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK (1928) 135.
0 See Standeven, Installation and Operation of "Mortgage Investment
Trust Account' (1929) 49 TRUST COMPANIES 663. In New York participa-
tions in a single mortgage were early allowed by statute. N. Y. Laws
(1917). c. 385.
7 See Standeven, op. cit. supra note 6, at 664, 666.
8 See McKINNEY, TRUST INVESTMENTS (1927) 29; The Handling of Small
Estates and Trusts (1930) 50 TRUST COMPANIES 684. The most recent
tendencies in participation are exemplified by the plans of the Lawyers'
Title and Mortgage Company and the New York Title and Mortgage Com-
pany, both of New York City.
"The JOURNAL was advised that on a recent mortgage participation plan
two leading firms of New York City gave written opinions reaching.dia-
metrically opposite conclusions.
10 Cf. Miller, op. cit. supra note 4. For a general presentation of the
problems in this connection see Undermining Integrity of Legal Invest-
ments for Trust Funds (1930) 50 TRUSTS COMPANIES 182; Fenninger, Cur-
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Since trust funds cannot be invested in the name of an in-
dividual and the cestui must be enabled to proceed against the
security,": a declaration of trust in the mortgages is essential
to the validity of any such plan of mortgage participation. Re-
quirements for a declaration of trust in realty vary among the
respective states, some prescribing that the trust be "created
and declared" in writing,12 others allowing it to be "manifested
and proved" by writing. 3 It has been submitted that a mort-
gage participation plan necessitates a contemporaneous docu-
ment acknowledging and securing the investment to all con-
cerned, 4 and this is undoubtedly the prevailing practice. Under
some existing plans the company issuing the certificates of in-
terest assigns the mortgages in trust to another eligible com-
pany.'5
It has frequently been urged as an objection to mortgage par-
ticipation for trustees that a commingling of trust funds, pro-
scribed at common law,1 is inherent in any variation of the
plan." The precise evil of commingling trust funds, however, has
never been clearly articulated by the courts. In many cases, cited
for the common law interdiction, the individual funds of the
trustee had been fused with those of the cestid,18 thus offending
the requirement that a trustee must not reap personal advantages
to the possible detriment of the beneficiaries. These cases are
not strictly applicable to a mingling of two or more trust funds,
and are weakened by decisions which have countenanced the
merger of individual and trust funds when the ultimate invest-
rent and Prospective Problemns Effecting Inve stent of Trust Fzd3 (1931).
51 TRUST CoMPANIEs '761. -
" Matter of Union Trust Co., 219 N. Y. 514, 114 N. E. 1057 (1916);
Cornet v. Cornet, 269 Mo. 298, 190 S. W. 333 (1916). By a New York
statute, however, a trust company may keep trust funds on deposit in
its own name awaiting investment. N. Y. Laws (1917) c. 385.
- Gaylord v. City of Lafayette, 115 Ind. 423, 17 N. E. 899 (1888);
Hutchins v. Van Vechten, 140 N. Y. 115, 35 N. E. 446 (1893) (early
New York rule).
'3 This rule, adopted in the majority of the states, represents a literal
interpretation of Section 7 of the Statute of Frauds. BOGERT, TRUSTS
(1921) 54 et seq.
'4 Standeven, op. cit. supra note 6, at 664; Berger, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 600.
:5 Cf. Berger, op. cit. supr note 1, at 600.
- 1 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1929) § 463.
"7 See Undermining Integrity of Legal Investments for Trust Funds,
supra note 10.
'I De Jarnette v. De Jarnette, 41 Ala. 708 (1868); The Boston & Colo.
Smelting Co. v. Reed, 23 Colo. 523, 48 Pac. 515 (1897); Dunn v. Dunn, 137




ment is thereby more profitable."' In other cases the commin-
gling merely furnishes additional evidence of negligence, which is
the ultimate ratio decidendi.2Y And in a number, the persuasive
facts seem to have been the falsified or incomplete records kept
by the trustee, preventing identification and proper division of
the separate funds.21 Perhaps with these distinctions in mind,
the New York Court of Appeals, in Matter of Union Trist Co.-,
approved trustee's accounts disclosing that the several trusts
had been accorded ratable participation in a mortgage, on the
grounds that the complete and open records were sufficient
answer in a suit upon an accounting, and, while professing to
follow the common law prohibition against commingling of trust
funds, recognized the legality of commingling under proper cir-
cumstances.
Since the majority of states prescribe a ratio between the
amount of money loaned on a mortgage and the appraised value
of mortgaged property 2 3 a mortgage participation plan, although
originally valid, may be rendered invalid for trust funds by a
depreciation of land values. Many recent participation plans,
perhaps in view of this contingency, add a guarantee of pay-
ment and/or a guarantee of the underlying mortgages running
to the participants, and/or a provision allowing substitutions of
the mortgages. 24 The guarantee of payment clause will probably
prove ineffectual to obviate the necessity of maintaining the stat-
utory ratio, not only because, under some existing statutes, it
is debatable whether the issuing companies have the power to
make such a guarantee, 2r but also because, to the participant,
it would be no more than an unsecured promise of the primary
company, which alone could not make an improper investment
legal. And since the statutes prescribing the ratio must be con-
strued as mandatory, a guarantee of the underlying mortgages
would seem to be of value only if interpreted to provide for the
substitution of proper mortgages to maintain the required ratio,
plus an assurance of promptness in the readjustment.
29 Barney v. Parsons, 54 Vt. 623 (1882); Barry v. Lambert 98 N. Y.
300 (1885).
2 0 Cf. Nance v. Nance, 1 S. C. 209 (1869) ; Dunn v. Dunn, supra note 18.
23 Lannin v. Buckley, 256 Mass. 78, 152 N. E. 71 (1926) ; of. Chesterman
v. Eyland, 81 N. Y. 398 (1880).
22 Supra note 11.
23 Statutes are collected in MCKINNEY, op. cit. supra note 8.
24 The plan of the New York Title and Mortgage Company under which
certificates series C3 were issued contains typical guarantee and substitu-
tion provisions. For a discussion of guarantee provisions seo Fenninger,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 766.
25 In Pennsylvania the attorney-general ruled that, while mortgage guar-
anty companies might guarantee participation certificates, banks could not.
(1927) Op. Att'y Gen. 46, 70.
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But the power of the issuing company to make substitutions
for the original mortgages after the inception of the plan,
whether expressed or implied, appears to cut across the common
law prohibition against the delegation of trust powers. While
ministerial and clerical duties of the trustee may be delegated,20
it is uncontested that control over the security pledged for trust
funds does not come within this category.2 And by investing
in participation certificates the immediate trustee dearly for-
feits some "control" over the security underlying the invest-
ment.28 It is arguable that the issuing company having itself
made a declaration of trust in favor of the participants is quali-
fied to perform trustee's functions in controlling the security.
And a possible analogy may be found in those cases which have
allowed trustees to invest in corporate bonds secured by realty
even in the absence of express statutory sanction. -0 Moreover,
since the power of substitution may be construed merely to ob-
ligate the issuing company to maintain the proper ratio, delega-
tion within such narrow limits may not vitiate the entire plan.
Some recent participation plans, however, also contemplate
the substitution of government or municipal bonds and even
cash.30 This is the result of sales experience which has shown
to the issuing companies that prospective customers would be
lost unless orders could be accepted pending the appearance of
eligible mortgages. To prevent the loss of such orders, the tem-
porary use of allowable securities would certainly not invalidate
an otherwise valid plan. Moreover the use of even moneys or
cash-31 may prove innocuous if the courts liberally interpret the
provisions for the deposit of such non-legals as temporary place-
6 Annis v. Annis, 61 Iowa 220, 16 N. W. 97 (1883); Ocott v. Gabert
86 Tex. 121, 23 S. W. 985 (1893).
27North American Trust Co. v. Chappell, 70 Ark. 507, 69 S. W. 5.16
(1902); Coleman v. Connolly, 242 Ill. 574, 90 N. E. 278 (1909); Stevens
v. Home Insurance Co., 199 Mo. App. 536, 204 S. W. 44 (1918) (power
to indorse a draft could not be delegated) ; Morville v. Fowle, 144 Aass.
109, 10 N. E. 766 (1887); Fowler v. Coates, 201 X. Y. 257, 94 N. E. 997
(1911).
28 The power of substitution in mortgage participation has been zeverely
criticized on the ground that the funds should have a specific, kmown
security back of them and that even the reputation of the larger and better
known issuing companies is not an adequate safeguard against the substi-
tution of less desirable mortgages. Undcrmining lutcgrity of Lcgal Invcst-
nents for Trust Funds, supra note 10.
29 Green v. Crapo, 181 Mass. 55, 62 N. E. 956 (1902); of. Appeal of
Davis, 183 Mass. 499, 67 N. E. 604 (1903).
'0 See note 8, supra.
33 Trust funds may not be invested in certificates of deposit, MCK: IxEY,
op. cit. supra, note 8, at 42; Baer's Appeal, 127 Pa. 360, 18 Ati. 1 (18O);
nor in unsecured promises, Wilmerding v. McKesson, 103 N. Y. 329, 8
N. E. 665 (1886); Conigland v. Gooch, 97 N. C. 186, 1 S. E. 053 (1SS7).
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ments of trust funds pending the investments in legals.32
In view of the prevalence of mortgage participation plans and
the attendant uncertainty of their validity for the investment of
trust funds, it was inevitable that statutory regulations should
be passed. Where there is only a general statute permitting the
approval of trustee's investments by courts, 3 the investment of
particular trust funds in a mortgage participation may -yin ap-
proval, while the legality of the plan as a whole remains undeter-
mined. Another type of statute permits the investment of trust
funds in all or part of issues of bonds or notes secured by first
lien mortgages or deeds of trust upon real estate,3 and while
literally including mortgage participation the provision might
conceivably be restricted to the normal type of bond issue. The
third type of statute, found in New York,3 New Jersey,", Penn-
sylvania - and Rhode Island,38 permits mortgage participations,
eo nomine, and enumerates the permitted characteristics of the
plans.
Even under the third type of statute, however, uncertainty
remains. The New York statute does not expressly refer to a
power of substitution, and, in designating mortgages as eligible
investments, uses the term indiscriminately in the singular and
the plural.3 9 Yet it was very probably designed to validate both
the power of substitution in the issuing company and the pooling
of mortgages, in view of the fact that the legislature was aware
32 Participation plans might further be contested on the ground that,
since the issuing company loans money on the mortgages at a higher rate
of interest than the return promised to the participants, it obtains an in-
cidental profit above the allowable commission if a part of the participa-
tion is allocated to trust funds in its own hands. It is quite possible that
this objection will not be sustained in view of the higher yield accruing
to the trust funds. See (1907) 20 HARv. L. REV. 337.
3 3 ALAsKA CoiP. LAWS (1913) §1737; ARIZ. REv. CODE (1928) § § 4130,
4137 (Sections refer to guardians, allowing probate court to order invest-
ments); IDAHO COiP. STAT. (1919) § 7709; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926)
§ 13470; Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) § 103; MONT. REV. CODE (CIboate, 1921)
§ 10306; W. VA. OFFICIAL CODE (1923) c. 44, § 4.
4 COLO. Comr. LAws (1921) § 5269; N. D. Comp. LAWS ANN. (1913)
§ 5198 (similar general provision); OKLA. COIP. LAWS ANN. (1921) §
4194.
3 Decedent's Estate Law, § 111; Personal Property Law, § 21.
36 N. J. Comp. STAT. (1910) Trustees, § 37a.
37 PA. STAT. (West, 1920) Trustees, § 8570.
38 R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) Savings Banks § 1, Clause IX (c).
39 " .trustee. . . may invest the same... in bonds and mortgages on un-
incumbered real property in this state worth fifty per centum more than
the amount loaned thereon, and in shares or parts of such bonds and mort-
gages, provided that any share or part of such bond or mortgage so held
shall not be subordinate to any other shares' thereof and shall not be
subject to any prior interest therein." Decedent's Estate Law, § 111.
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of these features of the plans when the statute was passed.40
There is a further question whether the provision that the in-
terest of no participant shall be subordinate to that of another 41
was intended to preclude the payment of one before another in
point of time, as the administration of the different trust estates
might well require the prior liquidation of one fund. Likewise,
in Pennsylvania the pertinent statute has proved so ambiguous
as to provoke repeated calls on the attorney-general's office for
clarification.- ' Eventually it was ruled that trust funds could
not be placed in participating certificates, although there might
be a division of one investment among different estates held in
trust by the company.43 A 1930 amendment apparently fails to
remedy the inadequacy of previous legislation.44
In view of the demand for mortgage participations and the
economic advantages furthered by their existence, it has been
argued that even under common law the various plans would
be upheld by the courts.-I Until statutory validation, however,
there will remain a degree of uncertainty that should be absent
in the proper administration of trust funds. Existing legisla-
tion also leaves much to be desired. Provisions for liquidating
the trusts when the beneficiary dies,-" for the designation of the
type and location of the mortgaged property, for the protection
of "incidental profits" if such profits are permissible, and for
recurrent valuations of the mortgaged property are not present
in any of the statutes except by implications of debatable con-
clusiveness. More precise enactments, however, may be expected
as the trust companies and other agencies are active in promot-
ing and sponsoring revisions and new legislation47
40 See (1928) Op. Att'y Gen. of N. Y. 211, 212.41 See note 39, supra.
42 See (1926) Op. Att'y Gen. of Pa. 129, 152; (1927) Op. Att'y Gen. of
Pa. 46, 68, 70.
43 See (1927) Op. Atty Gen. 57, 63.
44 Called upon to interpret the amendment, the attorney-general con-
cluded only that trustees could invest trust funds in first mortgages on
real estate in Pennsylvania securing a collateral form note given by the
individual owner and issued by a trust company organized under Penn-
sylvania law. (1930) Op. Att'y Gen. of Pa. 47, 54.45 CKINNEy, loc. cit. supra note 8.
41 Where one bond and mortgage is held in trust by a company which
allocates undivided interests to various trust funds in its own hands, the
New York statute permits repurchase by the company; but where par-
ticipation certificates are issued, no e-x-press provision is made. N. Y. Laws
(1917) c. 385.
4 The fact that banks, trust companies, and title and mortgage com-
panies in the larger cities, where realty values are higher, had favorable
experience with mortgage participation plans on improved urban property
even during the drastic realty depreciation in recent years, will undoubtedly
prove a persuasive influence on the first courts called upon to review the
legality of the plans as investments for trustees, even when they include
powers of substitution, renewal or e-tension of the mortgages pledged.
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